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Abstract: Based on the analysis of President Donald J. Trump’s social media, along with excerpts
from his speeches and press releases, this study sheds light on the framing of white supremacy during
the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Our findings reveal that the triad
of divide, divert, and conquer was crucial to Trump’s communications strategy. We argue that racist
nativism—or racialized national threats to American security—is key to comprehending the external
divisiveness in this strategy. When Trump bitterly cast China as the cause of America’s pandemic
fallout and Mexico as the source of other key American problems (i.e., crime and low-paid jobs for
U.S.-born Americans), he sowed clear racialized divisions between the United States (U.S.). and
these two nations. We further argue that nativist racism—or the framing of descendants from those
nations as incapable of ever being American—is key to comprehending the internal divisiveness
in the former President’s pandemic rhetoric. Trump’s framing of China and Mexico as enemies of
America further found its culprits in Asian and Latino Americans who were portrayed as COVID-19
carriers. Trump’s narrative was ultimately geared to diverting attention from his administration’s
mishandling of COVID-19, the dismal structural conditions faced by detained and undocumented
Latinos, and the anti-Asian bias faced by some of his Asian American constituents. In the conclusions,
this article makes a call for countering white supremacy by developing comparative approaches that
pay more attention to how different racisms play out for different groups.
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1. Introduction
President Donald J. Trump successfully brought a conservative populist movement,
rooted in white supremacy principles, to the highest office in the U.S. As President from
2017–2021, he spent most of his communications (e.g., rallies, tweets, briefings) trying
to energize his political base rather than appeal to the broader population of Americans
(Kumar 2020). In this article, we investigate Trump’s framing of two key policy planks that
informed his agenda (Qiu 2016; Lewandowsky et al. 2020; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020),
namely “China” and “immigration”, as they played out in the COVID-19 era. This study’s
main goal was two-fold. First, we analyzed how Trump blamed China, a longtime economic
rival to the U.S., for America’s war against the novel coronavirus—which Trump called the
“China plague”, the “China virus”, the “Wuhan virus”, and the “Chinese virus” among
other terms. Second, we examined how the Trump administration used the coronavirus
pandemic to advance its plans to build a wall in the U.S–Mexico border towards excluding
Mexicans and, particularly, undocumented Latin American immigrants from the U.S.
Trump’s divisive framing of China and Mexico as enemies of America further found its
culprits in Asians and Latinos in the U.S., on the basis of an inflammatory rhetoric that
diverted attention from policy measures, which would have eventually led to containing
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the spread of COVID-19 during his presidency. Ultimately, Trump’s goal was to rouse his
majority white electoral base towards conquering his political rivals.
This article shows how Trump’s three-fold strategy of divide, divert, and conquer
was crucial to his communications campaign and can only be understood within the
longstanding context of immigration and white supremacy in the U.S. We argue that racist
nativism—or racialized national threats to American security—is key to comprehending
the external divisiveness in this strategy. When Trump bitterly cast China as the cause of
America’s pandemic fallout, and Mexico as the source of other critical American problems
(i.e., crime, low-paid jobs for U.S. born Americans), he sowed clear racialized divisions
between the U.S. and these two nations. We further argue that nativist racism—or the
framing of descendants from those nations as incapable of ever being American—is key
to comprehending the internal divisiveness in this strategy. Some leveraged Trump’s
China-blaming into harassing Americans who looked Chinese, casting them as “forever
foreigners”, purportedly connecting them to the China that was the main target of the
President’s blaming stratagem (Benjamin 2021; Louie 2020a; Tessler et al. 2020). Trump’s
own rhetoric evolved to projecting the blame for the pandemic to Latino immigrants—
mostly those entering the country via the U.S.–Mexico border. Overall, he deployed
an all-encompassing white supremacist narrative that blamed Latino immigrants not
only for being carriers of COVID-19, but also for bringing crime and drugs along with
allegedly stealing jobs from American workers (Menjívar and Bejarano 2004; Chavez 2008).
Trump and his supporters further framed undocumented Latinos already working in the
U.S. as COVID-19 carriers and, alternatively, disregarded and demonized their economic
contributions. Trump even succeeded in creating in-group divisions among Latinos, as
certain members opposed other (mostly undocumented) Latinos, by expressing their own
internalized racism.
The motto of this article “divide, divert, and conquer” informs the presentation of
our findings. First, Trump’s divisive rhetoric diverted attention from his administration’s
mishandling of COVID-19, the dismal structural conditions faced by detained and undocumented working Latinos, and from the nativist racism giving rise to the anti-Asian
bias. By the same token, Trump’s diversions served him well to unify and galvanize his
mostly white electoral base against our nation’s purported enemies—China and Mexico.
The ultimate goal of the “conquest” was Trump’s continued political sway. The events of
6 January 2021 are a poignant example of how successful that strategy ended up being. By
then, the enemy within was embodied by the U.S.’s elected political leaders and democratic
institutions.
Our study reveals how all of this happened, with a focus on the divisive and diversionary aspects of the strategy, along with what we can do to prevent it from happening again.
A deeper understanding of Trump’s three-fold strategy (divide, divert, and conquer) is
key to understanding how the discursive stigmatization of particular ethnic/racial groups
translates into the symbolic and political violence perpetrated against those groups during
pandemic times (Viladrich 2021). Furthermore, and in order to counter white supremacy,
we need to pay more attention to how different racisms play out for different populations.
In this vein, a core contribution of our paper lies in its comparative approach. Asians in
the U.S. have been typically represented as striving racial minorities, whereas Latinos are
seen as not striving hard enough; and both are deemed as culturally superior to African
Americans, who supposedly lack the cultural resources to make it in America (Louie 2011,
2012). Strikingly, our comparative analyses reveal how the nativist racism in the wake of
Trump’s rhetoric was similarly deployed to divide Asians and Latinos from each other as
well as from the rest of America. Whether they are seen as “good” or “bad” minorities, they
both have been lambasted with equal force as forever foreigners. This is not surprising if
we recall that the U.S. has had a long history of dividing groups from one another for the
purpose of diverting attention from their common bonds in service of white supremacy
principles. Despite the existing voluminous scholarship on anti-Black, anti-Asian, and
anti-Latino racisms, our research shows that the divide, divert, and conquer strategy con-
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tinues to have immense power. Our study’s final goal was intended as a contribution
towards undoing this power by making publicly visible the ways in which different racisms
intersect and differ from one another, particularly through a divide, divert and, conquer
strategy.
2. Literature Review
2.1. White Supremacy at Work: Racist Nativism and Nativist Racism in Perspective
Trump’s 2016 campaign for the U.S. presidency was built upon an openly populist
platform intrinsically connected to white supremacy principles (Agnew and Shin 2019).
White supremacy is a system of domination in which racial, ethnic, and social inequalities are morally sanctioned, publicly legitimized, and legally reproduced. Rather than
operating in isolation, white supremacy works in tandem with global capitalism and
other systems of domination and exclusion, such as patriarchy, that together support unequal labor markets where racial and ethnic minorities experience exploitative oppression
(Golash-Boza et al. 2019).
Our particular discussion of white supremacy focuses on the multiple forms of racism
that have historically been present in the U.S. and which Trump tapped into. Building
on the Black/White binary of race relations that has traditionally been the focus in this
country, we seek to understand the “pluralist conceptions of racism” that speak to the
particular experiences of immigrants of color and their descendants in the U.S. (Sundstrom
and Kim 2014, p. 39). In doing so, we intend to shed light on how those experiences might
intersect with, and also stand apart from, the African American case (Huber et al. 2008). To
be clear, even though we acknowledge the central role that the Black/White binary has
played, and continues to play, in the reproduction of white supremacy, we argue that the
latter has kept evolving according to specific contexts and groups. Furthermore, a deeper
delineation and discussion of the multiple racialized logics constituting white supremacy
needs to occur for successful collective efforts to mobilize against it.
Structural racism, or the policies, practices, and norms that support white supremacy,
affects people of color across race, ethnicity, and immigrant status (Browne 2020; Flores 2020).
As U.S. history has shown, it also targeted European immigrants before they were racialized
as white (Kraut 1995). The internal division among immigrant groups, as in the case of
Latinos in this study, speaks to internalized racism. This occurs when individuals of a
racially marginalized group (whether they are immigrants or not) accept the stereotypes
and disrespect towards one’s own ethnic/racial group and “tolerate, minimize, deny,
and perhaps even justify racism” (David et al. 2019, p. 1063; David and Okazaki 2006;
Louie 2012).
Two forms of racism are particular to immigration and immigrants. Racist nativism
is distinctly related to the relationships between the U.S. and other nations and refers to
either the denial of entry of particular foreign groups or national tensions; nativist racism
speaks to the rejection of specific groups of immigrants and their descendants, after entry
has occurred. Both are part of the pluralist racisms that ultimately capture the diversity
in experiences among people of color, and predominantly those framed as the “other” in
the U.S.
In this study, racist nativism involves one country (i.e., the U.S.) keeping out perceived
threats from other nations that are framed as enemies. Racist nativist threats are deemed
as counter to native white Americanism, one that is Anglo-Saxon, Christian, and largely
Protestant (Saito 1997). An historical perspective helps us understand how racist nativism
formulates “threats” that are alternatively construed as foreign religions (i.e., Catholicism,
Judaism, and Islam), political systems (i.e., communism, Nazism, socialism, and anarchism),
goods (i.e., trade wars that damage our economy), and disease and peoples (regarded as
inassimilable) from other so-called inferior nations (Kraut 1995; Fairchild 2003; Gerstle 2007).
All are conceived as either contrary or dangers to America. Racist nativism culminated in
the Immigration Act of 1924, which effectively shut the door to large-scale immigration for
the next four decades and favored newcomers from Northern and Western Europe—who
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were seen as more aligned with Americanism. While the Border Patrol was established
to monitor all our borders, it was mainly the Southern (U.S–Mexico) frontier that was
surveilled, as compared to the Northern frontier with Canada (Ngai 2003). The goal of
racist nativism is to keep “dangerous” people, illnesses, ideas, and things out of the nation
state.
Once people and ideas entered the U.S., however, different exclusionary processes
unfolded, dependent on race (Lee 2019). The historical record documents an eventual elasticity of boundaries that welcomed white European immigrants after decades of vilification
(Ignatiev 1995; Brodkin 1998; Alba and Nee 2003; Alba 2009).1 In contrast, nativist racism
has characterized the reception of Asian and Latino immigrants,2 and their descendants,
who are perceived as “perennial foreigners”, regardless of how many generations their
families have been in the U.S. (Tuan 1999; Wu 2002; Dhingra 2003, 2004; Golash-Boza 2006;
Lima 2007, 2020). Racism is thus experienced differently by Asian and Latino Americans
as they are always seen from a binational perspective, coming from somewhere else and
never fully belonging here—no matter how long their ancestral roots extend.3
Further, these immigrants’ sense of not belonging has been legally inscribed. From
1924 to 1943, all Americans from every part of Asia were denied the right to become citizens
through naturalization. Chinese aliens, who were barred from naturalized citizenship
starting in 1882, were allowed to become American citizens in 1943; however, other Asians
had to wait until 1952. In several states, aliens ineligible for citizenship could not own land,
a measure designed to prevent wealth accumulation and to discourage future immigration.
Meanwhile, Asian Americans were denied the right to join unions, obtain professional
licenses, testify in court, marry local women, and bring over wives from the homeland
(Louie 2004). The racialized aspects in who does not have authorized status continue today,
as Mexican and Central Americans comprise the majority of undocumented immigrants.4
2.2. The Interplay of Racist Nativism & Nativist Racism
How have these two racisms—one external, as centered on the nation state’s impulse
to exclude foreigners from entry, and the other internal and rooted in the nation state’s urge
to otherize those already in its territory—become interconnected? Nativist racism, typically
propelled by white labor unrest, has certainly provoked exclusion from entry. During
the American economic recession of the 1870s, white working class labor, threatened
by employers’ use of Chinese immigrant labor, pushed for the 1882 Chinese Exclusion
Act—the first federal legislation that excluded labor migrants by national origin, race and
ethnicity.5 Until 1943, this Act, and its successors, effectively barred mass working class
labor migration from China to the U.S. (Louie 2004; Lee 2015). Similarly, when white
workers felt threatened by Mexican Americans during the Great Depression in 1929, more
than a half million were repatriated or deported—with estimates showing that more than
half were U.S. citizens. In response to white labor unrest, Operation Wetback (1953–1954)
was enacted, resulting in the deportations of more than one million Mexicans, including
those with authorized status (Huber et al. 2008).
Racist nativism has also taken nativist racism to a fever pitch, oftentimes during
war. Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1942 brought the U.S. into World
War II and led to Executive Order 9066, which resulted in the internment of Japanese
aliens (ineligible by American law for citizenship) and U.S.-born Japanese Americans.
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (or 9/11) led to civil rights violations against
Muslims, Sikhs, Arabs, and South Asians in the U.S. (Civil Rights Implications of PostSeptember 11 Law Enforcement Practices in New York 2004). More recently, Trump’s
rhetoric and policies to exclude travelers from Middle Eastern nations, based on the
idea that Muslims are terrorists, have been associated with hate violence against South
Asian, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Middle Eastern, and Arab communities (Modhi 2018). In
all these cases, the powerful external threat, rooted in racist nativism, led to the denial of
rights and hate crimes against Asian Americans, who ended up becoming stigmatized as
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forever foreigners on the soil of their adopted or birth country over several generations
(Louie 2020b; Viladrich 2021).
On the eve of COVID-19, Trump’s presidency rested on these dual racisms. A key part of
his electoral base was embodied by white working class Americans, who felt left behind by the
end of traditional manufacturing in the U.S. caused by global flows of labor (i.e., outsourcing),
along with increasing streams of immigrants of color into low-wage service jobs. Trump
appealed to white working class resentment against “the other” (Inglehart and Norris 2017;
Speed and Mannion 2017), which explains why he privileged campaigning over governing,
and rewarded those who showed unquestioned loyalty to his mandate rather than to all
Americans (Davis 2017; Holzer 2020; Kumar 2020; Jacobs et al. 2020b). In spite of the fact
that the American working class did not do better under Trump’s neoliberal policies, the
cultural bond between him and his followers became more relevant than resolving the
latter’s economic troubles.
3. Data and Methods
This study aimed to investigate Trump’s framing of economic, health, and immigration
policies related to China and Mexico and the implications therein for the U.S. during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, our data searches centered on his social media posts, speeches,
and press releases, between January and October 2020. Because of the intensity of the
advent and first surge of COVID-19 in the U.S., which occasioned numerous coronavirusrelated briefings in a single month, along with hundreds of tweets, we focused on the China
planks from January to April 2020. The bulk of the data on Latinos/Hispanics included the
period from June to September 2020.
Data searches were conducted via LexisNexis, White House statements (www.whitehouse.
gov; accessed from 18 May through 2 November), Factbase (https://factba.se; accessed
from 27 July through 4 November), and Trump Twitter Archive (http://www.trumptwitter
archive.com; accessed from August 13 through 2 November); the latter allowing a thematic
selection of Trump’s tweets. Until he was permanently banned from the site, Trump’s preferred platform was Twitter (Kumar 2020).6 We analyzed about 435 releases, remarks, and
press briefings and more than 650 tweets. The main speaker/writer was President Trump
and, to a lesser degree, Vice President Pence and other members of the administration. The
following search terms were chosen for identifying relevant passages leading to deeper
analysis: “Asian, China, Chinese, Coronavirus, COVID, Hispanic, illegal, immigrant, Kung
(for Kung Flu), Latino, undocumented, and Wuhan”.
The analysis that follows presents a chronological and systematic in-depth account
of Trumpian rhetoric. This approach is needed to situate his words in real time and in the
context of the pandemic pressures that he was facing and that evolved over the year 2020.
We used multiple close textual readings of Trump’s social media posts, speeches, and press
releases to chart the evolution of his rhetoric and to analyze how different aspects of his
verbal statements intersected with one another. Lastly, we examined how the discourse
ebbed and escalated in urgency and why.
4. Results
4.1. Trumpian White Supremacy in the COVID-19 Era
Trump portrayed himself as a wartime president leading the U.S. in its fight against
COVID-19. In March and April 2020, he made at least 20 plus references along these lines
while also calling the coronavirus the “invisible enemy”. Yet, similar to the agenda of other
wartime national leaders, Trump’s “real” war was actually geared to advancing his nativist
and racist agenda. These ideological tenets can be traced to Trump’s blaming rhetoric that
mostly targeted two nation states, China and Mexico, as will be examined next.
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4.2. China as the External Enemy
4.2.1. Trade Threat & the Cause of America’s Pandemic Problems
Trump used the bully pulpit to portray China as directly responsible for the viral
outbreak in the U.S. and the ensuing challenges in this country as well as globally. As with
the Mexico Wall, he drew on a well-used script—the trade wars between the U.S. and China
(Qiu 2016). These feuds had long resulted in sizable losses in American manufacturing jobs
and agricultural revenues, as the U.S. had been unable to successfully compete against the
goods produced in China. Phase 1 of the trade agreement that Trump brokered, signed
on 15 January 2020, was a U.S. victory. China agreed to purchase USD 200 billion more in
goods in 2020 and 2021 than in 2017 (Tully 2020). With COVID-19, Trump’s China soon
became the source of disease and the cause of America’s stunning pandemic fallouts. By
highlighting the same narrow set of themes, and talking points, Trump spotlighted China
as the external enemy. The more he was held accountable for America’s poor response to
the pandemic, the more he singled out China.
This double-barreled strategy had a slow ramp up. The headline for Trump’s communications in January and February 2020 was the signing of the U.S.–China trade agreement.
He portrayed himself as the forceful change agent able to redress the past history of
“China’s misbehavior on trade”. These tweets served to extol his leadership at a time when
the impeachment proceedings were directly questioning his leadership. Trump maintained
a measured tone in social media posts around the coronavirus, in his own tweets and
retweets. In late February, Trump issued 13 re/tweets about the Coronavirus, offering
praise for the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the World Health Organization
(WHO), all while applauding his own decision to “close the borders” to international
travelers from China. The U.S.’ temporary denial of entry to foreign nationals, who had
previously traveled in China in the past 14 days, was announced on 31 January 2020. That
set of restrictions, and those made effective about a month later, including banning travelers
from Italy and parts of South Korea, were found to be somewhat effective in slowing the
spread of the virus in the U.S. during these early weeks, and Trump emphasized the need
for the world to work together against the virus.
The end of February (2/28) foreshadowed what was to come. In one tweet, Trump called
out the virus’s origins in China and, in another, emphatically stated being unjustly blamed
by political rivals for the deleterious impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. “[T]he Coronavirus is
now being blamed, by the Do Nothing Democrats, to be the fault of ‘Trump.’” Here, Trump
set up the playbook for his racist nativist public approach to the pandemic. In sum, to
avoid blame, he made China the source of America’s pandemic woes. Still, his full set
of strategies was not deployed immediately. COVID-19 morbidity and mortality rates
were still relatively low, and on 7 March, Trump noted the nation only had 240 cases, and
11 deaths; therefore, he did not see himself as having a problem on his watch.
On 11 March, he did say that the virus “came out of nowhere”, “out of China”, as if
to suggest that his administration could not have expected its arrival, and he highlighted
his willingness to cooperate with Chinese officials. Even on 11 March, when the WHO
announced that the coronavirus was now a global pandemic, the then President continued
to maintain his composure. Terming COVID-19 a “foreign” virus, he announced the
deployment of full government resources to expeditiously defeat it. On 13 March, he
issued a national emergency. The next day, at a press briefing, Trump was flush with
optimism from the initial legislative efforts for what would become the economic stimulus
package. While reporting on 50 reported deaths from COVID-19 in the U.S., Trump ended
the briefing with words of unity and, once again, noted that the virus had originated in
China. Still, he did not point fingers.
We’re all in this together. It’s something that nobody expected. It came out of
China, and it’s one of those things that happened. It’s nobody’s fault. We all—we
all will solve this problem; we’ll solve it well.
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However, the health indicators were presenting a false picture. Because of the nation’s lack
of adequate testing, the numbers of infected Americans was artificially low (Wallach and
Myers 2020).
4.2.2. The China Playbook: High Gear
By mid-March, the situation had dramatically changed. New York City, which had
become a COVID-19 epicenter in the Spring of 2020, was experiencing a grim and steady
rise in daily cases and deaths. By 24 March, New York City had 20,011 cases and a death
toll of 280 (De Blasio Calls Stimulus Deal’s Treatment of N.Y.C. ‘Immoral’ 2020). New York
State followed California’s lead in issuing a stay-at-home order on 22 March. Due in part
to the nation’s improved testing capacity, by 27 March, there were 100,000 reported cases of
COVID-19 in the U.S., as compared to only 10,000 on 18 March (Wallach and Myers 2020).
Much of the national conversation at the time was about the lack of ventilators
(Jacobs et al. 2020a) and of personal protective equipment (Kulish et al. 2020), including
hospital beds and medical personnel in areas with large case surges. This was concomitant
to the job loss and shuttered industries (restaurants, the airlines, and tourism taking the
most direct hits) that followed the state shutdowns. The president received considerable
pushback over his reluctance to deploy the Production Defense Act aimed to mandate the
production of needed equipment, and to implement a cohesive federal response that would
combat both the pandemic and the resulting economic crisis. He was questioned about
the U.S.’ performance as compared to New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan, which
were doing better (Hatcher 2020). Trump’s diversionary strategy was to link these dismal
national indicators to China rather than to himself and the lackluster response that he was
spearheading.
Beginning on Twitter, Trump started to adopt a defensive, racist nativist posture.
From 13–27 March, the President issued 12 tweets/retweets, all alternatively containing
the following terms: the “Wuhan virus”, the “Chinese virus”, or the “China Coronavirus”.
In a series of short tweets, Trump blamed China for the virus’s arrival in the U.S. and
the bonanza of problems that ensued, while diverting blame from his leadership. In a
16 March tweet, for the first time, Trump publicly referred to COVID-19 as the Chinese
Virus that caused the airlines’ lost revenue along with the financial woes experienced by
other key industries at the time. He specifically mentioned companies “that are particularly
affected by the Chinese Virus” and the states “being hit hard by the Chinese Virus”. He also
remarked on how he signed the Defense Production Act to combat the “Chinese Virus”.
The President’s speeches during this time period amplified the racist nativism stand
captured in his tweets. On 17 March, Trump met with tourism industry executives and
used a similar strategy, as he did the day before with the airline industry, by subtly
deflecting blame from his administration to China. Both industries had already suffered
large economic losses from the stay-at-home orders, social distancing guidelines, and
people’s fear of travel. The President announced: “We’ll talk about . . . What’s happened
since the Chinese virus came about”. Then he repeated what Arne Sorenson, CEO of
Marriott, had already shared at the meeting, “And this all started in China . . . That’s
where you first saw the problem and it’s where you first got hit”. After Mr. Sorenson
confirmed this, Trump followed up with, “I hope you all heard that”. The next day, Trump
met with nurses and other frontline workers, another potentially nettlesome constituency
for him since they faced the brunt of caring for COVID-19 patients given the shortage of
personal protection equipment. Trump again opened with: “We’re using the full power
of government in response to the Chinese virus”. This is another example of Trump’s
rhetorical strategy to locate the pandemic problems of the U.S. with China, rather than
with his administration’s policies.
April brought a shift in Trump’s tone and language around the coronavirus, as compared to March. Both in his public remarks and tweets/retweets, the heated references to
the so-called China virus, Chinese virus, or the Wuhan virus were noticeably fewer. This
dialing back of nativism mirrors the different pandemic contexts that Trump faced in these
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two months. His tone, starting in mid-March, was especially strident because so many
events—directly linked to the pandemic—were new to all. These include the shutdowns,
the virus itself, and the escalating number of cases and COVID-19 death counts. The fever
pitch of Trump’s racist nativism, along with the nation’s growing nativist racism against
Asian Americans, paralleled the frenzied ascent of the viral attack: the virus was winning.
By April, Trump’s tone had softened. Although the COVID-19 medical indicators
of distress were still trending upward, they were nearing an apex—signaling a welcome
descent to come. April 10th marked the first high point in the nation’s new coronavirus
cases, and April 15th showed the first peak in daily deaths (Grim Day in U.S. as Covid-19
Deaths and Hospitalizations Set Records 2020). Not until late June would new cases reach
such a level, and not until December 2 would the nation exceed such a high daily death
count (Robertson et al. 2020). Throughout April, Trump spread notes of optimism from
the slowing of the viral spread and reassured the public that the (first) high point had
already passed. In his public communications, he referenced states’ plans to open up and
praised himself for expediting the economic relief payments that came from the Congress’s
passage of the stimulus package. He reminded us of the country that existed prior to
the pandemic: “The greatest economy ever put together”, with the “best employment
numbers” for African Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans and record
stock market returns.
Still, China was not absent from Trump’s rhetoric as he began to focus more on the
U.S./China economic rivalry, the countries’ new trade deal, the “China Ban” on foreign
travelers from there—all positive things from his perspective. China was also present in
Trump’s disparagement of the WHO, for what he now saw as its favoritism of China. On
April 14, he announced that the U.S. would stop funding the WHO until the results were
in from an investigation of its role in managing the early pandemic.
However, Trump did not entirely abstain from blaming China for the pandemic. There
were at least four instances, from April 18 to April 30, that riffed off this line about the
virus: “It came from China—in whatever form, 184 countries now are suffering because
of it. And it’s too bad, isn’t it? And it could have been solved very easily. When it was
just starting, it could have been solved really very easily”. In three of them, the line was
prefaced by a triggering reference. For instance, at a 30 April 2020 meeting, Trump was
asked about the nation’s unemployment rate of about 19 percent, not seen since the Great
Depression. Trump immediately brought up China:
We just got hit by a vicious virus that should have never been allowed to escape
China. They should have stopped it at the source. They didn’t do that. A hundred
and eighty-four countries have been devastated by it, including China, by the
way.
Meanwhile, some Americans were holding Asian Americans responsible for the
pandemic, casting them as perpetual foreigners, and the President played a key role in that
narrative as well.
4.2.3. China Blaming & Nativist Racism
Trump missed several opportunities to address head-on the nativist racism that was
flaring in the U.S. against Asian Americans and those who looked to be East Asian, regardless of their country of origin. Just as he was publicly casting China as the source of the
U.S.’ crises, other Americans were finger-pointing at Asian Americans, seeing them as the
face of China and, thus, blaming them as well. Again, COVID-19 became a case of racist
nativism that whipped up nativist racism to a fevered pitch. Perhaps Trump did not intend
for this to happen, but he also did not back away from his nativism stand once he was
apprised of its effects.
On 18 March, Trump opened a briefing with “our war against the Chinese virus” and
was challenged on his use of that term to describe COVID-19. Journalist Yamiche Alcindor
especially called out “reports of dozens of incidents of bias against Chinese Americans in
this country” and claimed that language like Trump’s only fuels these incidents. Trump’s
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lengthy exchange with the reporter occurred during this infamous “Kung Flu” briefing,
where he was asked about whether it was acceptable for an unnamed White House official
to refer to the coronavirus as “Kung flu”, a pun on the virus’s origins in China. Denying
knowledge about this, Trump further rejected the possibility that his use of “Chinese virus”
would put Asian Americans at risk by seeming to give permission to others to target them.
Notably, Trump did not address the incidents of bias against Chinese Americans in
the U.S. nor did he publicly reflect upon how Asian Americans might be put at risk by
this kind of vitriolic rhetoric. This was despite the fact that, as the reporter noted, Asian
Americans who looked to be of Chinese descent had already become the target of bias and
hate crimes. The next day, on 19 March, the Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council and
Chinese for Affirmative Action launched a website for reporting hate incidents. In late
March, ABC News referenced an FBI report warning of a potential surge in hate crimes
against Asian Americans, allegedly perpetrated by fellow Americans who had associated
the virus with China and Asian Americans (Louie 2020a).
Rather than revise his racialized nativist narrative around China, or at least distance
it from the racism facing Asian Americans, Trump deepened his China blaming as if the
two were not linked. According to Trump, China should have been more transparent and
provided the U.S. a two- to three-month head start on how to combat the coronavirus. Here
again, Trump drew an intentional linkage between the U.S. crisis and China’s past policies,
diverting the conversation from his administration’s own policies.
24 March 2020 is notable because Trump did not open his remarks with the Chinese
virus. Rather, he started with the Asian American community and the need for national
unity. The previous day, he had tweeted against the blaming of Asian Americans for “the
spreading of the virus”, that it “is NOT their fault in any way, shape or form”. Still, he did
not back away from claims that China should have told the world sooner about COVID-19.
Yet, generally, Trump cast China in an overall more favorable light—noting that the country
had stepped up its purchases of American agricultural goods, as per the trade agreement
and that, despite their longstanding rivalry, the two countries still had a good relationship.
The U.S. was now winning, thanks to him. But on 26 March, Trump doubled down. When
asked why he was backing away from his use of “the Chinese virus”, he replied:
I talk about the Chinese virus and—and I mean it. That’s where it came from. You
know, if you look at Ebola, if you look at all—Lyme. Right? Lyme, Connecticut.
You look at all these different, horrible diseases, they seem to come with a name
with the location. And this was a Chinese virus.
That same day, Trump was asked about the need to protect Asian Americans from bias
related to China’s role in the viral outbreak. He described such bias as “nasty language”.
Further, he declined to provide specific measures to protect Asian Americans. Still, this
became the fullest articulation of anti-Asian discrimination that he would address during
the entire first quarter of the pandemic (January–April). Meanwhile, both online and in
person, Asian Americans were being called racial and ethnic slurs and were told “you
are the face of the disease” and “you brought the virus here, go back to China”. Reports
further indicated that the bias went beyond “nasty language”, as some Asian Americans
were physically assaulted (Louie 2020a). According to the New York City Human Rights
Commission, 133 anti-Asian reports were filed from 1 February 2020 to 15 May 2020, as
compared to only 11 reports during the same period in the previous year. In response,
in late April, the New York City Commission on Human Rights launched a COVID-19
Response Team (Louie 2020a). Instead of addressing such matters, Trump ended the month
with China. What Trump did yet again on 26 March was say that the outbreak started in
China and that no one could have known this pandemic was going to happen in the U.S.
Finally, in the latter half of April, Trump repeatedly asked why Democratic Representative Nancy Pelosi (California) thought it was safe to dine in San Francisco’s Chinatown back
in late February. He mocked her intentions: “Let’s all have the big parade—Chinatown
parade”. (In fact, the Lunar New Year typically celebrated with a parade in Chinese
communities had already occurred in late January). Trump said Pelosi was marching in
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Chinatown, having a street fair or partying there, and thus not taking the virus seriously.
He ignored reporters’ questions about why he was calling out Pelosi if he himself had held
several rallies in February and March.
On 19 April, he retweeted a reference to Pelosi’s interview on Fox News about this
visit. Pelosi said she wanted to show support for the local ethnic economy, which was
taking a hit with the blaming of Chinese Americans and associated businesses for being
COVID-19 carriers. Customers were staying away from Chinatowns out of a mistaken fear
of catching the disease. However, the post by Arthur Schwartz, which Trump retweeted,
mentioned “the China virus” and portrayed Pelosi as doing the bidding of China’s top
leader: “She calls it ‘the flu’ and says that calling it the China Virus is racist towards
Asian Americans. Just as Xi Jinping ordered”. Neither the tweet nor Trump’s own retweet
mentioned the Asian American community being under siege.
4.3. Mexico as the External Enemy
4.3.1. Building the Wall: Keeping COVID-19 Carriers Away
Trump further deployed the blame game of COVID-19 to justify his campaign promise
to build the Southern Wall—a classic example of racist nativism. His obsession with “building the wall” became a continuation of his prime communication strategy of connecting
health security with border security, which dates to the beginning of his presidential campaign. In a written statement that was well covered in the media, candidate Trump openly
claimed that infectious diseases were coming to the U.S. by way of Mexican immigrants:
“The United States has become a dumping ground for Mexico and, in fact, for many other
parts of the world” (Walker 2015).
Early on during Trump’s presidential campaign, stopping “illegal immigration” had
turned into the centerpiece of a political platform that hyped up the “hordes” of people
flooding the country—including human caravans of immigrants coming in via Mexico.
On this issue, it is important to note that the representation of the U.S.–Mexican border as a source of disease is not new and actually became a foundational principle of
white supremacy in the north (Markel and Stern 2002). Coercive controls and attempts
to stop all traffic across the border, characterized by mandatory “disinfections” and “fumigation” of Mexican travelers coming into the U.S., was a staple of the public health
campaigns against typhus that were launched in 1917 and continued throughout the 1940s
(Mckiernan-González 2012).
During his mandate, Trump’s systematic obsession with finishing the construction of
the U.S.–Mexican border wall continued to rank high among his political priorities. From
January to October 2020, there were several tweets on “his” progress as he found ways to
tie in COVID-19 with amplified racist nativism rhetoric. In Trump’s rants about foreign
countries being responsible for the rising COVID-19 infection and fatality rates in the U.S.,
he openly blamed “illegals” (in allusion to Mexican and Central American border crossers)
for carrying the virus and endangering the country’s safety. When the pandemic first struck
the U.S. early in 2020, Trump saw the wall as an opportunity to merge his fight against
“illegals” with his commitment to stopping the “China virus” from entering through the
southern border. While rallying around the country, early in February and before any
COVID-19 fatalities had been identified in the U.S., he was quick to blame Mexicans and
other border crossers for bringing the virus. Then, on 10 March 2020, he tweeted: “Going
up fast. We need the Wall more than ever”. He also retweeted @ charliekirk11’s message:
Now, more than ever, we need the wall with China Virus spreading across the
globe, the US stands a chance if we can control of our borders. President Trump
is making it happen. I explain why this matter and & SO MUCH MORE. [sic]
Trump’s prime-time speech the next day (11 March) about the pandemic set the tone
for his “war against the foreign virus”, which would continue to take on militaristic features
consistent with racist nativism as time went on. Under the motto “keeping America safe
and protected”, in April 2020, the idea of COVID-19 as a “threat from the South” was used
by the U.S. Government to end the asylum seeker program (Blue et al. 2021). Trump’s
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“build the wall” battle cry was then added to the slogan “law and order”, which together
encapsulated his tough stance on immigration, along with his rejection of Black Lives
Matter and other social justice movements (Hutzler 2020). In one roundtable in Yuma,
Arizona in June, he remarked:
Without these public health measures, the southern border would be a global
epicenter of the viral transmission. And if you look at some of the towns on the
other side of the wall—as an example, in California, we have a certain area that
is heavily infected on the Mexico side. And if we didn’t have a border wall there,
it would be a—it would be really a catastrophic situation.
Well, you have to see San Diego. So, on the other side of San Diego is a tremendously big problem with COVID and other things. And they wanted that wall
so badly—they were calling. Everybody was calling—I won’t even tell. I won’t
embarrass them by saying who called. But people that didn’t want the wall
outside wanted the wall. [ . . . ] And I built the wall, and it worked 100 percent.
You know what I’m talking about. And then, I see one of the politicians two
weeks later. “They should take down the wall”. By the way, it worked so well.
But he was saying, “They should’ve taken down the wall”. But now they don’t
even say that, because now it stopped COVID; it stopped everything. It stopped
the whole deal.
During a photo-op with Arizona Governor Doug Ducey on 23 June, the two joined
forces to turn that special day into what one journalist called “Blame it on the Mexicans
Day”. Ducey set the stage by blaming the uptick in COVID-19 on “Mexican travelers
coming to Arizona for getting health care” (Diaz 2020). By this time, it was clear that a
correlation existed between the poor handling of the crisis (not passing mask-wearing
regulations, keeping non-essential commercial establishments open, and promoting large
gatherings, including rallies) and the peak in COVID-19 cases. However, rather than taking
responsibility, either Trump for the nation or Ducey for Arizona, others—Mexicans—were
to blame. Thereafter, the wall was “needed” more than ever before.
Over the summer of 2020, newspapers such as USA Today had obtained e-mails and
notes, exchanged between the Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar and the
Department of Homeland Security, seeking evidence to prove that the virus was being
brought by Mexicans at the border (Murphy and Stein 2020). Looking for a “Cinco de
mayo effect”—in reference to a Mexican national celebration—government officials were
hoping to blame Mexicans for the COVID-19 surge. Right-wing think tanks like the Center
for Migration studies backed these claims by stating they were allegedly in possession of
data demonstrating that severely ill Mexican Americans, dual citizens, legal permanent
residents, and Mexicans infected with the virus had been flooding the U.S. in order to seek
health care they were unable to obtain in Mexico (Southern Poverty Law Center 2020).
Called the “COVID refugee flood”, a number of news outlets reported on an allegedly sick
caravan of immigrants that had traveled into Texas before moving northwards (Bensman
2020). Trump ran with these narratives exhorting the U.S. to quickly crack down on
immigration and close the southern U.S. border.
4.3.2. Latino Detainees and Latino Workers: Unseen, Unprotected, and Unvalued
To bolster the exclusion strategy, Trump himself publicly drew on evidence from
Latinos already in the nation, including those that were sent to detention centers after trying
to cross the border. He emphasized their “getting infected with COVID-19” as affirmation
that they were carriers of disease and that they should be kept out to begin with. Meanwhile,
ICE detention centers became a breeding ground for COVID-19 because of a lack of health
care, overcrowding, and unsanitary conditions (Wilson and Stimpson 2020). However,
the latter structural conditions (subject to policy interventions) were not part of Trump’s
talking points. Instead, he deployed a long-known strategy of diverting attention from
the impact of structural racism in public health issues, one that has historically targeted
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immigrants and Blacks. This discourse shifted attention from the fact that immigrants’
and Blacks’ working conditions were unhealthy and their neighborhoods were “often
untouched by public health” (Falk 2020).7
Trump and his adherents also focused on undocumented Latinos in Florida’s agricultural industry as well as in the Midwestern meat packing plants. In all these cases,
the structural racism occasioning crowded, unsanitary working conditions—perfect for
the spread of the virus—went unmentioned. Further, the contributions of Latino workers
to obtaining food to grocers went unsaid. In one remarkable tweet from 4 April 2020,
Trump generally acknowledged the work of food workers and producers who had kept
Americans fed during the pandemic. However, he failed to mention the crucial role played
by undocumented Latinos in the U.S. food production industry:
America owes our very hard-working food supply workers so much as they
produce and deliver high quality food for us during this horrible COVID-19.
Join me in thanking our Farmers, Ranchers, Processors, Distributors, and stores!
@JohnBoozman
Trump quickly made clear that federal COVID-19 financial relief would not reach
undocumented immigrants by further admonishing governors, mostly Democrats, for
having approved emergency measures that allegedly benefitted undocumented families
during this crisis. Although Latinos in these jobs were doing essential work, their omission
in Trump’s speeches framed them as subordinate outsiders. Certainly, they were not
publicly acknowledged either as immigrants or Hispanics and, using Saito’s terminology
(Forthcoming), were deemed “digestible” as if they were feeding the national body with
their labor force.
Rather than acknowledging the deep health disparities that make ethnic/racial minorities more susceptible to disease (Viladrich 2020), conservatives allied with the U.S.
executive branch in order to reproduce a scapegoating narrative. For instance, during
a June press conference in Tallahassee, Florida governor Ron DeSantis blamed essential
workers for the rapid increase in COVID-19 cases, stating that “overwhelmingly Hispanic”
day laborers and agriculture laborers were at the root of his state’s surge in COVID-19
cases (Santiago 2020). In a circular logic, those who were on the frontline feeding American
households along with those working at farms and meatpacking factories—being the ones
most exposed to the virus—were blamed as “virus carriers”, instead of being acknowledged as victims who had been forced to put themselves in harm’s way for the sake of
protecting the common good (Murphy and Stein 2020).
4.3.3. Framing the “Good” Versus the “Bad” Latinos
During the COVID-19 crisis, Trump kept tapping into internalized racism for the sake
of dividing the “good” from the “bad” Latinos, on the basis of garnering the former’s
support for his campaign against the latter—all while encouraging racist nativism. On
4 March 2020, a tweet by @Latino Coalition posted a link to Trump’s goal of “closing the
border to save lives”. This was followed by additional tweets in which he praised himself
for stopping immigration to the U.S. during the COVID-19 crisis. In the video linked to the
original tweet, he applauded Hispanic border patrol agents for keeping the border safe:
The Hispanic Americans courageously serving in our armed forces include the
brave Hispanic Americans protecting our nation on the front lines as border
agents. We have a lot of border agents doing a great job and we are actually
up to mile 138 on the wall, they [Hispanic Americans] understand the border
. . . You know who wants this more than anybody else? The Hispanics, because
they get it! They are here, they want to be safe and they know that some of
the people coming across are not the people you want to be with . . . And the
Hispanics, they understand the border. A poll came out with very high numbers
and people saying: ‘I can’t imagine why Hispanics like President Trump so much’
. . . Do you know why? Because they understand the border better than anybody
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else and they want a safe border . . . It is estimated that more than half of our
nation border agents, even higher, are Hispanic Americans and they are doing an
incredible job! We are immensely grateful for their amazing job in seizing drugs
in stopping human trafficking, which is so terrible and ensuring a safe, human
lawful system of immigration . . . The nation is grateful for their defending our
American flag.
Three claims transpire from the excerpt above, which, together, contribute to a “divide
and conquer” stand on the basis of racist nativism. First, Trump’s quick decision to close
the Southern border in early March 2020 was rhetorically framed as a strategic measure
to protect the population of “legit Hispanics”—the ones legally living on this side of the
border—from the criminal and diseased horde waiting to cross from the other. Second,
Trump’s reference to “the people coming across” is faceless: they are human traffickers,
dealers, MS-13 gang members, criminals and “bad hombres” (Kulig et al. 2020). Contrary
to his well-celebrated “Hispanic American” allies, which in Trump’s speeches are typically
addressed by their first names, such as Jorge or Maria; “illegals” are nameless, anonymous
aliens whose only motivation to come to this country is to bring crime, drugs, disease, and
unrest. As noted in the literature (Viladrich 2019), the conservative framing of immigrants
is most successful when using general categories (e.g., immigrants, illegals, aliens) that
avoid references to either personal or socio-demographic specificities.
Finally, the excerpt above meets the goal of welcoming segments of the subaltern
into the umbrella of whiteness. By highlighting the role of Hispanic border agents in
keeping “illegal aliens” away, Trump reaffirmed his commitment to assimilate them into
the national “us”, while reminding Hispanics of their patriotic duty to defend the physical
and symbolic boundaries of the American nation. The President’s keen maneuvering of
divisional politics achieved its maximum expression when praising Hispanic Americans
for being “vigilant” against the nation’s enemies—namely, Latino trespassers.
Just as he was building the wall to keep out the “bad hombres” from entering the
U.S., Trump put forth policy initiatives to help his Latino base. On July 9, the White House
Hispanic Prosperity Initiative and the Interagency Working Group were created by one
of Trump’s Executive Orders. These programs sought to improve access to educational,
training, and economic opportunities for Hispanic American students by promoting school
choice, personalized learning, family engagement, civics education, and pathways to indemand jobs. Without apparent contradiction, Trump continued addressing his Hispanic
audiences by saluting their efforts to exclude those illegally crossing into the U.S. For
instance, in August 2020, Trump visited Yuma (Arizona) for a second time that summer, a
town that was hit hard by COVID-19 and stated:
And you know, nobody understands the border better than Hispanics. They
know what’s good, what’s bad. They don’t want bad people coming into our
country, taking their jobs, taking their homes, causing crime. Hispanic Americans
are the people who are the most in favor of what we’re doing at the border.
As suggested earlier, one way for Trump to emphasize racist nativism was by reminding his Latino base of the large number of border agents and home security employees
serving his country. Yet, who, among the large Latino population, would constitute the
ideal supporter eager to join Trump’s political base? Trump’s recruitment efforts targeted
those who bought into his internalized racism diatribe against the Mexican threat from
without (the hordes waiting to invade) as well as those fighting the Latino threat from
within (the undocumented immigrant).
Our analysis of Trump’s social media and public speeches reveals that his cherished
Hispanic audience was far from homogenous and included a diverse group of first- and
second-generation Latinos who “played by the rules”, including immigrants, who were
legally in the U.S. They are factory managers, small business owners, independent contractors, and disenfranchised employees who, in many cases, felt betrayed by the Democratic
Party. Contrary to monolithic images of Latinos, recent work has shown the enormous
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diversity of the Latino electorate that favored Trump during the past two presidential
elections (Alamillo 2019; Galbraith and Callister 2020; Gonzalez-Sobrino 2020).
Despite Trump’s overt anti-immigrant stance and his openly derogatory remarks
against Mexicans, he scored records of votes among the Hispanic population—even surpassing previous Republican candidates (Alamillo 2019). His Latino followers seemed to
identify with the white majority in as much as they did not endorse pro-immigrant agendas
nor hold anti-racist stands. A study based on the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election
Study found that, among Hispanics, denial of racism was the strongest predictor of support
for Trump, a relationship that remained above even party identification and ideology
(Alamillo 2019). This includes denial of racism against Hispanics as well as against Blacks
and women.
From January to October 2020, Trump’s tweets mostly focused on praising himself
for Hispanics’ steady economic and educational achievements since taking office; one
popular tweet clearly summarizes this sentiment: “We have achieved more for HispanicAmericans in less than 47 months than Joe Biden has achieved in 47 years” (25 September
2020). Trump’s social media entries seemed to reflect an alternative reality that ignored the
hardships largely experienced by minority ethnic and racial groups in the U.S., as seen in
this tweet from 12 July 2020:
@realDonaldTrump is a champion for the American worker. Under his leadership,
Hispanic unemployment reached a record low and median income for Hispanic
households reached a historic high, surpassing $50K for the first time on record.
We close this section with a quote from one of Trump’s speeches that keenly demonstrates his maneuvering skills to draw Hispanics’ divisive sentiments against both Joseph
Biden (his political opponent for the U.S. Presidency) and the “China virus”. Referencing
Biden, he said:
But he betrayed the Hispanic Americans. Prior to the China virus, the plague that
came in from China, we achieve the lowest Hispanic American unemployment
rate in history of our country ([ . . . ] It was six months ago we are building it up
again you know make an America great again we say now make America great
again. Make America great again because we did it. Now I have to do it again.
5. Conclusions
To divert attention from his poor pandemic leadership, Trump deftly assumed the
mantle of a wartime president and delved into his racist nativist playbook to divide
the public by framing China and Mexico as enemies of the U.S. His racist nativism, in
turn, spilled over into the blaming of Asian and Latino Americans. With Asians, Trump
minimized the scapegoating done by others, without noting the role of his racist nativism
in fueling it, and, as in the case of Pelosi “dancing in the streets of Chinatown”, he ignored
it altogether. With Latinos, Trump actively amplified his racist nativism by accusing
Mexicans, along with undocumented immigrants, of purposely bringing the virus into the
U.S. and sought nativist racism alliances with “legit” Hispanics—who purportedly joined
the federal government’s aims to combat, and expel, “illegals”.
The end result was that, in the U.S., the COVID-19 pandemic turned into a prime
medium for the production and dissemination of white supremacist, anti-immigrant, and
anti-Semitic rhetorics, which fueled the antagonism against immigrants and refugees
(Human Rights Watch 2020). No matter that Asian and Latino Americans are typically
portrayed in counterpoint to one another, as the so-called “good” and “bad” minorities
(Louie 2011, 2012). The “Chinese virus” and Latin American “illegal immigrants” ended
up being depicted similarly as human invaders that trespass into the U.S. for the purpose
of destroying the nation. As a symbolic extension of the immigrant body, the infectious
pathogen was ultimately merged with the nameless MS-13 gang member, the Chinese
visitor, the forever foreigner Asian American, and the freeloading Latino. Furthermore,
the connection between the Asian and Latino culprits in the COVID-19 saga was both
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chronological and semiotic. At the onset of the pandemic, Asians were blamed for bringing
the virus to the U.S., while Latinos were accused of spreading it. As time passed—and
the virus reached border towns and inner states—“illegal” Latinos became pictured as
COVID-19 carriers crossing into U.S. territory. By initially ignoring the impact of COVID
and later on shifting the blame for the administration’s poor handling of the crisis, Trump
and allies unearthed some old tricks of white supremacy and reinvented the “other” as
their prime culprit.
How can a president who calls Mexican immigrants drug dealers and rapists and
whose immigration policies are characterized by images of families separated at the border
(and children held in cages) be appealing to a Latino minority? To be maximally effective,
white supremacy must grant the right to inclusion to not only one marginalized group
over the other (Smith 2016; Saito Forthcoming) but, particularly, to subsets of subaltern
ethnic/racial groups. In this vein, our analysis revealed the hierarchical distinction between
those Latinos welcomed into the national polis (e.g., border patrol agents, business owners)
and those excluded (e.g., mostly undocumented immigrants).
Our study of Trump’s public narratives reveals his attempts to conceal nativism and
racism by stressing the idea of protecting the nation and its citizens against those portrayed
as dangerous invaders. This brings to mind another recent president who used the wartime
metaphor, and whose rhetoric did not often match his policies. President George W.
Bush was called out for the discrepancy between his conciliatory words towards Muslim
Americans in the wake of 9/11 and the actual law enforcement policies that targeted
them—along with South Asian Americans who were mistaken for being Muslim (Civil
Rights Implications of Post-September 11 Law Enforcement Practices in New York 2004;
Greenwald 2016). In the case of Trump, there were mismatches between his rhetoric around
winning the war against COVID-19 and his poor management of the health crisis, and
between his conciliatory words around Asian Americans and his China blaming, which
ended up fueling aggressions against Asian Americans. Further, Trump did not even
attempt conciliatory words towards either undocumented Latino immigrants seeking to
enter the U.S. or those already here. Instead, he simply went full frontal in his rhetoric
towards them in a manner that did match his policies.
Our work further reveals that while the dangers framed in white supremacy vary,
depending upon context, they all serve to otherize those publicly portrayed as “foreign”. In
the COVID-19 era, the threats posed by Chinese nationals and East Asian Americans, who
look like they might be of Chinese descent, are framed as health-related. Although Trump
also connected disease with Latino immigrants, he further weighed in on their purported
unethical and criminal nature. His claims to be “the least racist person he knows”, and
being in favor of racial integration became compatible with the denigration of specific racial
groups, whether undertaken by himself or by others—not on the basis of their phenotypic
markers but on their assumed incompatibility with American wellbeing and values. In the
end, white supremacy provides a screen for racist nativism and nativist racism. Native
white U.S. citizens, the “real Americans”, are distinguished from those who are presumed
to be essentially foreign and who either should not be let into the country or, if they are
already here, can never and will never become true Americans.
Scholarly and public recognition of how a divide, divert, and conquer strategy otherizes across groups is crucial to efforts to dismantle white supremacy. If this strategy—and
how it is used against multiple groups—continues to be publicly invisible, then enduring
social change rooted in social justice principles will remain difficult to achieve. For instance,
Asians and Latinos should know that the forever foreigner status ascribed to their groups
has been used skillfully to diminish their interests and rights as Americans. Although East
Asians have been particularly singled out here, Americans from every part of Asia have
been touched by anti-Asian hate (Louie 2021; Viladrich 2021). Blacks, whites, and Native
Americans must be part of this important dialogue as well, just as Asians and Latinos have
to join the conversations about anti-Blackness and how it intersects and differs from the
experiences of their own racial/ethnic groups. Certainly, even though the divide, divert,
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and conquer strategy has been used with African Americans, a key difference, as shown by
our findings, is how it has been used. As we have discussed in previous pages, regardless of
how long they and their families have been here, Asian and Latino Americans are framed
as forever foreigners—linked to nations typically seen as inferior—that are threatening
the sheer core of native white Americanism. During times of white labor unrest, war, and
pandemic diseases, as shown in this study, the two types of racisms can interconnect quite
powerfully.
Our work highlights the need for public scholarship that moves beyond the confines
of the academy into the public domain. Within a public scholarship framework, activists,
media, and government officials could more quickly identify when people are deftly
employing a divide, divert, and conquer strategy and call them on it. This is especially
crucial today, when so many Americans are thought to be balkanized into disparate media
silos with different understandings of the real facts. Coalition building can only occur if
people have a clear baseline understanding of everyone’s experiences and perspectives.
Our study has limitations, which will be addressed by future research undertaken by
ourselves and colleagues. The year 2020 selected for our media analysis allowed us to deconstruct the nativist racism and racist nativism narratives that “went viral” during a novel
pandemic and election year. However, our approach did not contemplate the full spectrum
of Trump’s discursive legacy. A fuller analysis would require a focus on Trump’s rhetorics
from the years preceding his election in 2016 into his entire presidency, and following the
election of November 2020. Future research should also analyze whether and how Trump
deployed the divide, divert, and conquer strategy with additional “otherized” groups
and how different (and/or similar) this looked from his framing of Asians and Latinos.
Future research should also pay attention to how public narratives impact individuals,
coalition-building, and policies along with the long-term effect of these rhetorics on diverse
audiences. For instance, we need studies on the enduring impact of white supremacy
narratives on the portrayal of specific ethnic and racial groups as “disease carriers” vis-à-vis
COVID-19’s origin and risk factors.
Studies on framing effects are essential to assessing the discursive impact on people’s
beliefs and attitudes along with their emotional triggers to particular controversial issues.
In this vein, upcoming scholarship will examine the short- and long-term impact of Trump’s
white supremacy rhetorics on the public’s beliefs and emotional reactions regarding the
cause and facilitators of COVID-19. Finally, we should investigate whether broader public
discussions of otherizing do result in different perceptions and behaviors, including greater
coalition building for broader equality. The resulting data drawn from such studies will
be crucial to policymakers seeking to blunt the deleterious impact of white supremacy,
which, with Trump as its main acolyte, has largely pervaded the latest discourses of race
and ethnicity in the U.S. and the world.
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Notes
1

Despite these strides, President-Elect Joseph Biden is only the nation’s second Catholic head of state. There has not yet
been a Jewish American president, and in 2020, the Anti Defamation League, which had been tracking reported incidents of
anti-Semitism in the U.S. for 40 years then, reported that 2020 marked an all time high in reported incidents (Diaz 2020).

2

Black immigrants represent another important case that is outside the scope of this paper. See Waters (1999); Kasinitz et al. (2008);
Hamilton (2019).
The representation of Latinos as forever foreigners has a particular poignancy for Mexican Americans, some whose ancestral
roots predate the U.S.-Mexico War (1846–1848): “Mexicans and Chicanas/os are perceived as foreigners, ironically, in a land that
once belonged to them” (Lima 2007, 2020; Huber et al. 2008, p. 46).

3
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4

In 2017, Mexicans represented 47 percent of the nation’s undocumented immigrants, with Central Americans being another 18
percent, and Asians reaching nearly 14 percent (Kamarck and Stenglein 2019). This rise of the undocumented associated with
Latin and Central America started in the wake of the Immigration Act of 1965, which, for the first time, limited immigration from
countries in the Western Hemisphere (Passel and Cohn 2019).

5

Nativist racism against Chinese Americans did not disappear as they continued to face severe labor market restrictions (Lieberson
1980; Louie 2004).
In 2017 and 2018, Trump issued more than 6000 tweets, and in 2019 alone, more than 4800 (Kumar 2020).

6
7

As Alan Kraut notes in an interview, “victim-blaming” of diverse groups including Irish Catholic immigrants in the 1832 cholera
epidemic, Eastern European Jews in the 19th century for tuberculosis, and free blacks in the antebellum American South all
shifted attention “away from issues like clean water, good sewage, alleviating over-crowding” (Falk 2020).

References
Agnew, John A., and Michael E. Shin. 2019. Mapping Populism: Taking Politics to the People. Lanhan, Boulder, New York and London:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Alamillo, Rudy. 2019. Hispanics para Trump?: Denial of Racism and Hispanic Support for Trump. Du Bois Review: Social Science
Research on Race 16: 457–87. [CrossRef]
Alba, Richard. 2009. Blurring the Color Line: The New Chance for a More Integrated America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 2003. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Benjamin, Elliot. 2021. Trump, the Coronavirus Pandemic, Asian American Xenophobia, and Humanistic Psychology. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology 61: 244–59. [CrossRef]
Bensman, Todd. 2020. A New Migrant Caravan Forms. Why It and the Next Ones Matter to U.S. Border Security. Center for Migration
Studies. Available online: https://cis.org/Bensman/New-Migrant-Caravan-Forms (accessed on 12 December 2020).
Blue, Sarah A., Jennifer. A. Devine, Mathew P. Ruiz, Kathryn McDaniel, Alisa R. Hartsell, Christopher J. Pierce, Makaila Johnson,
Allison K. Tinglov, Mei Yang, Xiu Wu, and et al. 2021. Im/mobility at the US–Mexico border during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Social Sciences 10: 47. [CrossRef]
Brodkin, Karen. 1998. How Jews Became White and What That Says about Race in America. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Browne, Anthony. 2020. Confronting COVID-19, State Violence and Anti-Blackness: The Endemic Virus of Structural Racism. Available
online: http://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/?forum-post=confronting-covid-19-state-violence-anti-blackness-endemicvirus-structural-racism (accessed on 20 November 2020).
Chavez, Leo R. 2008. The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Civil Rights Implications of Post-September 11 Law Enforcement Practices in New York. 2004. New York Advisory Committee to
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Available online: https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/ny0304/main.htm (accessed on 27
November 2020).
David, E. J. R., and Sumie Okazaki. 2006. Colonial mentality: A Review and Recommendation for Filipino American Psychology.
Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 12: 1–16. [CrossRef]
David, E. J. R., Tiera M. Schroeder, and Jessicanne Fernandez. 2019. Internalized Racism: A Systematic Review of the Psychological
Literature on Racism’s Most Insidious Consequence. Journal of Social Issues 75: 1057–86. [CrossRef]
Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. 2017. Campaign Over, President Trump Will Hold a (What Else?) Campaign Rally. New York Times, February
16. Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/politics/campaign-over-president-trump-will-hold-a-whatelse-campaign-rally.html (accessed on 4 December 2020).
De Blasio Calls Stimulus Deal’s Treatment of N.Y.C. ‘Immoral’. 2020. New York Times, March 25. Available online: https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/03/25/nyregion/coronavirus-new-york-update.html (accessed on 18 December 2020).
Dhingra, Pawan. 2003. The Second Generation in ‘Big D’: Korean American and Indian American Organizations in Dallas, TX.
Sociological Spectrum 23: 247–78. [CrossRef]
Dhingra, Pawan. 2004. Being American Between Black and White: Second Generation Asian American Professionals’ Racial Identities.
Journal of Asian American Studies 6: 117–47. [CrossRef]
Diaz, Elvia. 2020. COVID What? Gov. Doug Ducey Is Using Trump’s ‘Blame the Mexicans’ Routine to Distract You. AZ Central. June
23. Available online: https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/elviadiaz/2020/06/23/did-gov-doug-ducey-blamemexicans-arizona-coronavirus-surge/3246567001/ (accessed on 24 January 2021).
Diaz, Johnny. 2020. Anti-Semitic Incidents Surged in 2019, Report Says. New York Times, May 12. Available online: https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/05/12/us/antisemitic-report-incidents.html (accessed on 18 December 2020).
Fairchild, Amy L. 2003. Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and the Shaping of the Modern Industrial Labor Force. Baltimore:
John Hopkins University Press.
Falk, Dan. 2020. The Undark Interview: A Conversation with Alan M. Kraut. Available online: https://undark.org/2020/04/24
/interview-alan-m-kraut/ (accessed on 2 December 2020).

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 280

18 of 20

Flores, Roseanne. 2020. Ingredients for a Perfect Storm: When Racism, Discrimination and Health Collide—The Case of COVID-19.
Roosevelt House Faculty Journal. Available online: http://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/?forum-post=ingredients-perfectstorm-racism-discrimination-health-collide-case-covid-19 (accessed on 2 December 2020).
Galbraith, Quinn, and Adam Callister. 2020. Why Would Hispanics Vote for Trump? Explaining the Controversy of the 2016 Election.
Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 42: 77–94. [CrossRef]
Gerstle, Gary. 2007. The Immigrant as Threat to American Security. In From Arrival to Incorporation: Migrants to the U.S. in A Global Era.
Edited by Elliott R. Barkan, Hasia Diner and Alan M. Kraut. New York: NYU Press, pp. 217–45.
Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2006. Dropping the Hyphen? Becoming Latino(a)-American through Racialized Assimilation. Social Forces 85:
27–55. [CrossRef]
Golash-Boza, Tanya, Maria D. Duenas, and Chia Xiong. 2019. White supremacy, patriarchy, and global capitalism in migration studies.
American Behavioral Scientist 63: 1741–59. [CrossRef]
Gonzalez-Sobrino, Bianca. 2020. Searching for the “Sleeping Giant”: Racialized News Coverage of Latinos Pre-2020 Elections.
Sociological Forum 35: 1019–39. [CrossRef]
Greenwald, Glenn. 2016. Let’s Not Whitewash George W. Bush’s Actual, Heinous Record on Muslims in the U.S. The Intercept. Available
online: https://theintercept.com/2015/11/30/lets-not-whitewash-george-w-bushs-actual-heinous-record-on-muslims-in-theu-s/ (accessed on 2 March 2021).
Grim Day in U.S. as Covid-19 Deaths and Hospitalizations Set Records. 2020. New York Times, December 3. Available online:
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/12/02/world/covid-19-coronavirus (accessed on 11 December 2020).
Hamilton, Tod G. 2019. Immigration and the Remaking of Black America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Hatcher, William. 2020. A Failure of Political Communication Not a Failure of Bureaucracy: The Danger of Presidential Misinformation
during the COVID-19 Pandemic. The American Review of Public Administration 50: 614–20. [CrossRef]
Holzer, Harold. 2020. The Presidents vs. the Press. New York: Dutton.
Huber, Lindsay Perez, Corina Benavides Lopez, Maria C. Malagon, Veronica Velez, and Daniel G. Solorzano. 2008. Getting beyond the
‘symptom,’ acknowledging the ‘disease’: Theorizing racist nativism. Contemporary Justice Review 11: 39–51. [CrossRef]
Human Rights Watch. 2020. Human-Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response. New York: HRW, March 19. Available online:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19-response# (accessed on 15 October 2020).
Hutzler, Alexandra. 2020. How Law and Order Became 2020’s Build the Wall. Newsweek, September 16. Available online: https:
//www.newsweek.com/how-law-order-became-2020s-build-wall-1532407 (accessed on 2 October 2020).
Ignatiev, Noel. 1995. How the Irish Became White. New York: Routledge.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2017. Trump and the xenophobic populist parties: The silent revolution in reverse. Perspectives on
Politics 15: 443–54. [CrossRef]
Jacobs, Andrew, Matt Richtel, and Mike Baker. 2020a. ‘At War With No Ammo’: Doctors Say Shortage of Protective Gear Is Dire. New
York Times, March 19.
Jacobs, Lawrence R., Peter Wehner, and David Hopkins. 2020b. American Conservatism under Donald Trump: Its Rise, Decline, and
Future. Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy. Available online: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/214949
(accessed on 14 December 2020).
Kamarck, Elaine, and Christine Stenglein. 2019. How Many Undocumented Immigrants Are in the U.S. and Who Are They? Washington: Brookings Institute. Available online: https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-many-undocumentedimmigrants-are-in-the-united-states-and-who-are-they/ (accessed on 2 November 2020).
Kasinitz, Philip, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway. 2008. Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of
Age. Cambridge and New York: Harvard University Press & Russell Sage Foundation.
Kraut, Alan M. 1995. Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the Immigrant Menace. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kulig, Teresa C., Amanda Graham, Frances T. Cullen, Alex R. Piquero, and Murat Haner. 2020. “Bad hombres” at the Southern US
border? White nationalism and the perceived dangerousness of immigrants. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology.
Article first published online on 1 December 2020. [CrossRef]
Kulish, Nicholas, Sarah Kliff, and Jessica Silver-Greenberg. 2020. The U.S. Tried to Build a New Fleet of Ventilators The Mission Failed.
New York Times, March 29.
Kumar, Martha Joynt. 2020. Contemporary Presidency: Presidents Meet Reporters: Is Donald Trump an Outlier among Recent
Presidents? Presidential Studies Quarterly 50: 193–215. [CrossRef]
Lee, Erika. 2015. The Making of Asian America: A History. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Lee, Erika. 2019. America for Americans: A History of Xenophobia in the United States. New York: Basic Books.
Lewandowsky, Stephan, Michael Jetter, and Ullrich K. H. Ecker. 2020. Using the president’s tweets to understand political diversion in
the age of social media. Nature Communications 11: 5764. [CrossRef]
Lieberson, Stanley. 1980. A Piece of the Pie: Black and White Immigrants Since 1880. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lima, Lázaro. 2007. The Latino Body: Crisis Identities in American Literary and Cultural Memory. New York: New York University Press.
Lima, Lázaro. 2020. Essential Work, Disposable Lives: Latino Invisibility, Black Lives, and Coalition Politics in the Age of Covid-19.
Roosevelt House Faculty Journal. Available online: http://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/?forum-post=essential-workdisposable-lives-latino-invisibility-black-lives-coalition-politics-age-covid-19 (accessed on 29 December 2020).

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 280

19 of 20

Louie, Vivian. 2004. Compelled to Excel: Immigration, Education, and Opportunity among Chinese Americans. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Louie, Vivian. 2011. Complicating the Story of Immigrant Integration. In Writing Immigration: Scholars and Journalists in Dialogue.
Edited by Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, Vivian Louie and Roberto Suro. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 219–35.
Louie, Vivian. 2012. Keeping the Immigrant Bargain: The Costs and Rewards of Success in America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Louie, Vivian. 2020a. Asian Americans and COVID-19: What We Still Need to Know about Race and Racial Exclusion in America.
Roosevelt House Faculty Journal. Available online: http://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/?forum-post=asian-americanscovid-19-still-need-know-race-racial-exclusion-america (accessed on 29 December 2020).
Louie, Vivian. 2020b. Why Ethnic Studies Is Pivotal Today. CUNY Forum 8. Available online: https://aaari.info/cuny-forum-8-louie/
(accessed on 29 December 2020).
Louie, Vivian. 2021. Asian American Studies: Telling the Story of America. New York: Human Rights Program at Hunter College.
Markel, Howard, and Alexandra Minna Stern. 2002. The Foreignness of Germs: The Persistent Association of Immigrants and Disease
in American society. The Milbank Quarterly 80: 757–88. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
McCann, James A., and Michael Jones-Correa. 2020. Holding Fast: Resilience and Civic Engagement among Latino Immigrants. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Mckiernan-González, John. 2012. Fevered Measures: Public Health and Race at the Texas-Mexico Border, 1848–942. Durham: Duke University
Press.
Menjívar, Cecilia, and Cynthia Bejarano. 2004. Latino Immigrants’ Perceptions of Crime and of Police Authorities: A Case Study from
the Phoenix Metropolitan Area. Ethnic and Racial Studies 27: 120–48.
Modhi, Radha. 2018. Communities in Fire: Confronting Hate Violence and Xenophobia Political Rhetoric. Washington: South Asian Americans
Leading Together (SAALT). Available online: https://saalt.org/report-communities-on-fire-confronting-hate-violence-andxenophobic-political-rhetoric/ (accessed on 27 November 2020).
Murphy, Brett, and Letitia Stein. 2020. How the CDC Failed Public Health Officials Fighting the Coronavirus. USA Today. September
18. Available online: https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2020/09/16/how-cdc-failed-local-healthofficials-desperate-covid-help/3435762001/ (accessed on 1 December 2020).
Ngai, Mae. 2003. The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States,
1921–1965. Law and History Review 21: 69–108. [CrossRef]
Passel, Jeffrey S., and D’Vera Cohn. 2019. Mexicans Decline to Less Than Half the U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population for the First Time.
Washington: Pew Research Center. Available online: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/us-unauthorizedimmigrant-population-2017/ (accessed on 27 November 2020).
Qiu, Linda. 2016. Donald Trump’s Top 10 Campaign Promises. Available online: https://www.politifact.com/article/2016/jul/15
/donald-trumps-top-10-campaign-promises/ (accessed on 13 November 2020).
Robertson, Campbell, Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, Joseph Goldstein, and Mitch Smith. 2020. Virus Deaths Approach Spring
Record Amid Changing U.S. Crisis. New York Times, November 28. Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/28
/us/covid-deaths-united-states.html (accessed on 1 December 2020).
Saito, Natsu Taylor. 1997. Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness”, and Racial Hierarchy in American Law. Oregon Law
Review 76: 261–346.
Saito, Natsu T. Forthcoming. Why Xenophobia? Berkeley La Raza Law Journal. Available online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3645466 (accessed on 6 December 2020).
Santiago, Ibon. 2020. Trends and Innovations in Biosensors for COVID-19 Mass Testing. ChemBioChem 21: 2880. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Smith, Andrea. 2016. Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy Rethinking Women of Color Organizing. In Color of
Violence: The INCITE! Anthology. Edited by INCITE! Women of Color against Violence. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 66–73.
Southern Poverty Law Center. 2020. Center for Immigration Studies. Available online: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/
extremist-files/group/center-immigration-studies (accessed on 9 December 2020).
Speed, Ewen, and Russell Mannion. 2017. The Rise of Post-truth Populism in Pluralist Liberal Democracies: Challenges for Health
Policy. International Journal of Health Policy and Management 6: 249. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Sundstrom, Ronald, and David Haekwon Kim. 2014. Xenophobia and Racism. Critical Philosophy of Race 2: 20–45. [CrossRef]
Tessler, Hannah, Meera Choi, and Grace Kao. 2020. The Anxiety of Being Asian American: Hate Crimes and Negative Biases during
the COVID-19 Pandemic. American Journal of Criminal Justice 45: 636–46. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Tuan, Mia. 1999. Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites? The Asian Ethnic Experience Today. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Tully, Shawn. 2020. Remember Trump’s Trade Deal with China? So Far They Are Buying Half What Was Promised. Fortune, October 3.
Available online: https://fortune.com/2020/10/03/trump-china-trade-deal-war-results-so-far/ (accessed on 1 December 2020).
Viladrich, Anahí. 2019. “We Cannot Let Them Die”: Undocumented Immigrants and Media Framing of Health Deservingness in the
United States. Qualitative Health Research 29: 1447–60. [CrossRef]
Viladrich, Anahí. 2020. COVID-19 Amplified: Deconstructing Immigrants’ Vulnerability during Pandemic Times. Roosevelt House
Faculty Journal. Available online: http://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/?forum-post=covid-19-amplified-deconstructingimmigrants-vulnerability-pandemic-times (accessed on 14 December 2020).
Viladrich, Anahí. 2021. Sinophobic Stigma Going Viral: Addressing the Social Impact of COVID-19 in a Globalized World. American
Journal of Public Health 111: 876–80. [CrossRef]

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 280

20 of 20

Walker, Hunter. 2015. Donald Trump just Released an Epic Statement Raging against Mexican Immigrants and ‘Disease’. Business
Insider, July 6. Available online: https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trumps-epic-statement-on-mexico-2015-7 (accessed
on 26 February 2021).
Wallach, Philip A., and Justus Myers. 2020. The Federal Government’s Coronavirus Response-Public Health Timeline. Washington: Brookings
Institution Report. Available online: https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federal-governments-coronavirus-actions-andfailures-timeline-and-themes/ (accessed on 29 December 2020).
Waters, Mary. 1999. Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Wilson, Fernando A., and Jim P. Stimpson. 2020. US policies Increase Vulnerability of Immigrant Communities to the COVID-19
pandemic. Annals of Global Health 86: 57. [CrossRef]
Wu, Frank H. 2002. Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White. New York: Basic Books.

